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Law and Politics in Judicial Oversight of Federal 
Administrative Agencies 
Martha Anne Humphries 
Donald R. Songer 
University of South Carolina 
Administrative agencies play a substantial role in the formulation and implementation of national 
policy. Central to this role is their exercise of discretion. A normative consensus exists that such dis- 
cretion should be constrained by administrative deference to the rule of law. The courts of appeals 
are expected to insure that such discretion is constrained. The analysis reported below examines how 
effectively they fulfill that expectation. The findings suggest that agency success is related to politi- 
cal considerations, with agencies being successful when their decisions are consistent with the policy 
preferences of the judges. However, variables that captured elements of the legal model were also re- 
lated to success. Taken together, it appears that the appeals courts respond to both legal concerns and 
political preferences. Thus, the courts appear to fulfill the expectation that they will constrain the 
worst abuses of discretion by imposing the rule of law. 
F or decades students of politics in the United States have recognized that ad- 
ministrative agencies are important political actors that play a substantial role in 
the formulation as well as the implementation of national policy. As Peters 
(1989) notes, federal administrative agencies are "major formulators" of policy. 
Central to their role as policymakers is the extensive discretion exercised by ad- 
ministrative agencies (Horowitz 1994). While there is widespread acceptance of 
the necessity for administrative discretion, a normative consensus exists that 
such discretion should be constrained by administrative deference to the policy 
preferences of the president and Congress in addition to the substantive and pro- 
cedural requirements of the rule of law. It is well known, however, that neither 
subservience to political superiors nor fidelity to the rule of law can be assumed 
to characterize all administrative action. Anecdotal evidence abounds of the 
abuse of discretion that results in the interjection of personal favoritism or polit- 
ical bias into administrative decisions. "Discretion has its dark side . . . [it] 
enables and even invites officials to overreach, to discriminate invidiously, to 
subordinate public interests to private ones . . . and to tyrannize over the citi- 
zenry" (Schuck 1994, 155). As a result, control of administrative discretion has 
been a "central problem" for decades of both theorists and practitioners of poli- 
tics in the United States (Horowitz 1994). 
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This concern has led to substantial agreement that there must be some legal 
restraints on the exercise of administrative discretion (Peters 1989). The "tradi- 
tional form" of such attempts to provide legal control on administrative 
discretion "has been review by more or less independent tribunals of various 
kinds, principally generalist article III courts" (Schuck 1994, 156). In this con- 
text, judicial review is seen as a "check on lawlessness, a check on 
administrative agents making choices based on convenient personal or political 
preferences without substantial concern for matters of inconvenient principle" 
(Robinson 1991, 181). 
A corollary of the expectation that courts will implement a legal check on the 
abuse of discretion by agencies is the assumption that courts, especially the fed- 
eral appellate courts, will faithfully apply the law rather than their own political 
attitudes when they review agency decisions. Otherwise, instead of a check that 
imposes the rule of law, judicial review will merely result in the substitution of 
the private preferences of one set of actors for those of another. The present 
study explores whether review of agency decisions by the United States Courts 
of Appeals is in fact grounded in the rule of law, or is primarily a reflection of 
the policy preferences of the judges. 
The courts of appeals have traditionally played a central role in the judicial re- 
view of agency decisions. This traditional appeals court role of supervising 
administrative agencies has steadily grown in importance over the last several 
decades in response to several environmental changes. First, their traditional role 
of supervising federal regulatory agencies has grown in importance as federal 
regulation of the economy has become more pervasive. Moreover, as the number 
of administrative appeals adjudicated in the circuit courts has increased dramati- 
cally, the number of cases of all types heard by the Supreme Court has remained 
flat (or even slightly declined). Thus, the objective probability that the Supreme 
Court will review an administrative law decision of the courts of appeals has de- 
clined sharply. As a result, the courts of appeals have become the final arbiter in 
practice for the overwhelming majority of challenges to the decisions of federal 
administrative agencies (Songer 1991). Therefore, if there is to be any legal 
check on abuse of discretion by administrative agencies, the courts of appeals 
are likely to have both the first and the final word in the judicial arena. 
Existing Research on Administrative Agencies before the Court 
Given the appeals courts' significant role in overseeing administrative agen- 
cies, it is surprising to find very little research on this topic. Studies abound on 
administrative agencies before the Supreme Court, yet similar studies cannot be 
found on the courts of appeals. 
Empirical studies of federal administrative agencies before the Supreme 
Court, dating back as far as 50 years, show that agencies are one of the most suc- 
cessful litigants with average success rates of at least 70 percent (Canon and 
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Giles 1972; Crowley 1987; Handberg 1979; Pritchett 1948; Sheehan 1990, 1992; 
Tanenhaus 1960). Some commentators suggest that one key to the success of 
agencies in court has been the Administrative Procedure Act (Tanenhaus 1960). 
The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) established the "substantial evidence 
doctrine," which mandates that the courts defer to the agency's assessment of 
fact provided there is substantial evidence to support their evaluation (Robinson 
1991). These findings suggest that something of a paradox exists: courts are ex- 
pected to be a primary line of defense against the abuse of agency discretion, yet 
they also are expected to give substantial deference to the exercise of such dis- 
cretion. The "arbitrary and capricious test" and substantial evidence doctrine that 
form the basis of this deference "were built on a fundamental acceptance of the 
agency as expert, the notion that the agency was the arbiter of an objective, 
value-free technical rationality" (Horowitz 1994, 139). 
The legal model of court decision making in agency cases suggests that courts 
are primarily concerned with clear precedent and an agency's adherence to pro- 
cedural rules rather than with the substantive policies produced by the agency 
(Crowley 1987; Sheehan 1990). Under a long string of precedents, legal princi- 
ples like the substantial evidence doctrine and the arbitrary and capricious test 
suggest considerable judicial deference to agency decisions, especially in their 
application of statutes to complex factual situations. Such unbiased treatment 
should lead to comparable levels of support among all the agencies, regardless 
of the agency's political orientation. However, this hypothesis has not been sup- 
ported in the literature. In a study of administrative agencies' success rates 
before the Supreme Court from 1957 to 1968, Canon and Giles (1972) found the 
court was more supportive of decisions made by certain agencies than by others. 
The authors found that differences in agencies' substantive policies and goals ap- 
peared to play a role in determining the Court's support of the agencies. "In other 
words, variance in the Court's willingness to support an agency as a recurring lit- 
igant stems largely from the justices' attitudes toward the agency's substantive 
policies rather than its procedural behavior" (Canon and Giles 1972, 190). 
Building on Canon and Giles's findings, researchers began attempting to ex- 
plain why the differences in support of agencies existed. Donald W Crowley 
began this endeavor by dividing the agencies into two categories: "old style" 
economic agencies and "new style" social agencies (1987). He hypothesized that 
the Supreme Court would support economic agencies at higher rates than social 
agencies partially due to the ideological battles existing in social regulation leg- 
islation and implementation. Crowley found the Court did support economic 
agencies more frequently than social agencies, suggesting that it was the jus- 
tices' policy values rather than legal concerns that determined an agency's 
success in court. 
In contrast to these studies, some support for a legal rather than an attitudinal 
model of decision making was discovered by Sheehan (1992), who hypothesized 
that a flaw in the past studies was the almost exclusive emphasis on independent 
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regulatory agencies while virtually ignoring the executive agencies. He argued 
that an implication of the legal model was that independent regulatory agencies 
would receive greater deference from the Court because they were somewhat 
more insulated from the political influence of the executive branch and their 
own procedures followed a quasi-judicial format. His research found that the 
executive-type agencies fell under much stricter scrutiny than the independent- 
type agencies. As hypothesized, the Court was more willing to defer to the 
independent rather than the executive agencies (Sheehan 1992). But support for 
the notion that judicial attitudes rather than legal principles determined court re- 
view of agency decisions was enhanced when researchers analyzed whether the 
directionality of an agency's decision had an impact on the outcome of the case. 
Both Crowley (1987) and Sheehan (1990) found the ideological direction of the 
agency's decisions to have a significant influence on the level of deference 
granted by the Court to the agency. The researchers found that liberal and con- 
servative judges both tended to shift their support for a particular agency based 
on the ideological direction of the agency's decision. Similarly, in a study of the 
Burger Court from 1969 to 1977, Spaeth and Teger (1982) found that justices 
were more likely to defer to probusiness or antilabor decisions of the agencies 
than prolabor or antibusiness decisions. These results reinforced the view that 
the ideological directionality of the agency's decision is influential in explaining 
the Supreme Court's differential treatment of administrative agencies (Spaeth 
and Teger 1982). 
In summary, the high rate of success of agencies in the Supreme Court has 
been well documented, but we know less about the rate of success of agencies in 
the courts of appeals. In an examination of the effect of litigation resources on 
the success of appellants in the courts of appeals, Songer and Sheehan (1992) 
found that the federal government, a category including but not limited to ad- 
ministrative agencies, had the highest rate of success. A study by Sheehan and 
McWilliams (1992) on the circuit courts for 1979, 1983, and 1987 found that 
agencies were less successful than in the Supreme Court, and that there was no 
substantial difference in success rates between the executive and independent 
agencies. In Willison's (1986) study of the D.C. circuit from 1981 to 1984, he 
finds strong support for agencies, although there is considerable variance across 
the agencies and judges. He finds that some of the variance is accounted for by 
the political environment of the agency and the background characteristics of the 
judges, specifically their party affiliation. 
Aside from the exceptions noted above, the research concerning administra- 
tive agencies in the federal courts focuses almost exclusively on the Supreme 
Court. In addition, the literature suggests that the legal model does not explain 
the success of agencies in court. Instead, the attitudes of the justices and their 
concern with the policy consequences of agency decisions appear to take prece- 
dence over the expectation that the courts will use law to constrain the discretion 
of administrative agencies. 
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A Model of Appeals Court Review of Agency Decisions 
Given the paucity of systematic analysis of judicial review of agency decisions 
in the courts of appeals, there is reason to question whether one should assume 
that the conclusions based on Supreme Court studies apply with equal force to ap- 
peals court review. There are several reasons to suspect that the conclusion that the 
legal model is irrelevant may not be applicable. First, in other areas of the law 
(e.g., civil liberties and criminal procedure) there is evidence that in the courts of 
appeals precedent has greater impact and that the attitudes of the judges are of less 
significance than in the Supreme Court (Howard 1981; Richardson and Vines 
1970; Songer 1982; Songer and Haire 1992; Songer, Segal, and Cameron 1994). 
Moreover, none of the examinations ofjudicial review of administrative decisions 
directly tested for influences from the legal model. Instead, in each of the studies 
it was inferred that the law did not matter because evidence was uncovered that the 
policy preferences of the justices were strongly related to the patterns of support 
for the agencies. That is, the studies of Supreme Court review of agency decisions 
generally failed to investigate the possibility of the joint influence of the legal 
model and judicial attitudes on decisions. Finally, the studies of agency review in 
the Supreme Court generally failed to control for the possibility that the attitudes 
of the justices would have differential effects in relation to different types of is- 
sues. The model of judicial review described below is designed to test for the 
possibility of the joint influence of the legal model and judicial preferences on the 
likelihood that agency decisions will be overturned by the courts of appeals under 
controls for the types of issues present in each case. 
The test of the prediction derived from the earlier studies (Crowley 1987; 
Sheehan 1992; Spaeth and Teger 1982) that agency success in the Supreme 
Court was primarily a function of the policy preferences of the justices rather 
than any influences associated with the legal model is straightforward. If a sim- 
ilar political model explains agency success in the courts of appeals, then 
agencies should be successful when the policy direction of their decision is con- 
gruent with the policy preferences of the majority of the reviewing court. To 
operationalize this test, one must create a measure of the ideological direction of 
the agency's decision and the ideological preferences of each court panel. To de- 
fine the directionality of the agency's decision, we followed the definitions of 
"liberal" and "conservative" most commonly used in empirical analyses of lower 
federal courts. Specifically, to create the variable Agency Direction we employed 
the definitions used by Carp and Rowland (1983)1 in their analysis of federal dis- 
trict decisions (e.g., a liberal decision was defined as one that supported the 
government in a challenge to the authority of the government to regulate the 
economy, that favored unions in conflicts against management, that supported 
'These definitions are essentially the same as those used in most studies using the Supreme Court 
Data Base, Harold J. Spaeth (Principal Investigator), and are consistent with the definitions of liberal 
and conservative adopted by Crowley (1987) and Sheehan (1990, 1992). 
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greater protection for the environment or consumers in environmental and con- 
sumer protection cases, or supported the person claiming a violation of 
constitutionally protected rights in a civil liberties case). 
Unfortunately, we do not have direct, independent measures of the ideology of 
the hundreds of appeals court and district court judges who served on the panels 
of the courts of appeals that have reviewed agency decisions over the 20-year pe- 
riod included in this analysis. Nor is it feasible to obtain them. We therefore 
adopted an inferential measure of the ideology of each judge based on a linear 
combination created by the logistic regression coefficients from a model of 
judges' votes in nonconsensual cases. The dependent variable in this model was 
judges' votes in economic cases with 1 = liberal vote and 0 = conservative vote. 
The characteristics of judges that best explained the likelihood of a liberal vote 
were the ideology of the appointing president and the region of appointment (a 
North/-South dichotomy)2 Specifically, for appointing president we adopted the 
measure created by Tate and Handberg (1991) that scored judges appointed by 
liberal ideologically oriented presidents as 1, those appointed by conservative 
ideologically oriented presidents as -1, and those appointed by presidents that 
were not strongly ideological in their appointment strategies as 0. Using the co- 
efficients from this model resulted in the following equation for a measure of 
judge ideology: 
Judge Ideology = .225 * Appointing President + .356 * Region 
A measure of the ideology of the appeals court panel that reviewed the agency 
decision (labeled Panel Ideology) was created by computing the mean judge ide- 
ology score of all the judges (including district judges and appeals judges on 
senior status) who participated in the panel's decision. To test the predictions of 
the political model, we then computed the multiplicative term Panel Ideology * 
Agency Direction. If the political model of decision making is correct, this in- 
teractive term should be positively related to the probability of agency success in 
the courts of appeals. 
A major impediment to empirical attempts to assess the impact of the legal 
model on appellate court decision making has been the difficulty of identifying 
objective indicators that capture the effects of law and precedent. While a central 
feature of the legal model is the expectation that judges should follow precedent, 
judgments about whether a court in a particular case actually followed precedent 
tend to be highly subjective, typically raising serious questions about their valid- 
ity and reliability. In this study, the implications of legal precedents are examined 
2We tested other measures of state and/or regional influence, specifically including the ADA 
scores of the home state senators at the time of appointment; the Wright, Erikson, and McIver mea- 
sure of state ideology; and the Berry et al. (1998) dynamic measure of state ideology (for both the 
time of appointment and the time of the judicial decision). However, none of these measures were 
statistically significant, nor did they improve the performance of the overall model to a statistically 
significant degree. 
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to identify the nature of the legal challenges to agency action that may be ex- 
pected to result in the greatest probability of success for the challengers. Under 
a political model, like the realist school of jurisprudence, or the modern-day 
Attitudinal Model, the legal basis of the challenge to an agency's decision 
should have no impact on the likelihood that the agency will be supported, 
since the Attitudinal Model views legal doctrine as "mere rationalization" (Segal 
and Spaeth 1993). 
As noted above, the justification for judicial deference to agency discretion 
has traditionally been rooted in the view of agencies as the possessors of techni- 
cal expertise that is superior to the expertise of the courts. As outlined in the 
APA, and more specifically in the substantial evidence doctrine, judicial defer- 
ence toward agencies should be exercised if there is substantial evidence to 
support the agency's assessment of facts. To test whether circuit judges were 
bound by this legal doctrine, we created a variable Substantial Evidence, which 
was coded "1" if the agency decision was challenged under the substantial evi- 
dence doctrine, and "0" if the doctrine was not applied. The legal model leads to 
the expectation that because of the expected judicial deference in such cases, 
agency success rates should be higher in such cases than in cases based on the 
interpretation of statutes. 
Alternatively, it is reasonable to believe that judges will be least impressed by 
an agency claim for deference in cases that involve interpretation of a federal 
statute. Interpretation of federal statutes are at the heart of the judicial role. Thus, 
the legal model leads to the prediction that for cases in which the variable Fed- 
eral Law is coded "1" to indicate the presence of an issue of interpretation of a 
federal statute, agencies will have lower rates of success than they will in cases 
in which the variable is coded "0" to indicate the absence of such an issue. 
The two variables described above reflect enduring features of the legal model 
that should have affected appeals court decisions throughout the period studied 
if there is validity to the legal model. But to adequately capture the effects of the 
legal model, one must also model the dynamic element of changing precedent. 
Most important for a study of the courts of appeals are the changing precedents 
announced by the Supreme Court. Unfortunately, no quantifiable direct measure 
of changing precedent is both available and reliable. However, a rough indicator 
of changing precedent in administrative agency cases may be obtained from cal- 
culating the percentage of liberal and conservative agency rulings that were 
affirmed by the Supreme Court. We looked at Supreme Court policymaking in 
cases reviewing agency decisions. We ran the analysis separately for four peri- 
ods, divided by changes in natural courts: late Warren Court (1962-68 terms), 
early Burger Court (1969-75 terms), late Burger Court (1976-85 terms), and the 
Rehnquist Court (to the end of 1989 term). For each period, we calculated two 
measures: the percentage of liberal agency decisions that were supported by the 
Court and the percentage of conservative decisions supported by the Court. The 
measure of Supreme Court precedent was conceptualized as the probability that 
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a given agency decision at issue in the courts of appeals would be supported if 
the appeals court decision was reviewed by the Court. For example, if the ap- 
peals court was reviewing a conservative agency decision in 1986, the 
percentage of conservative agency decisions supported by the Rehnquist Court 
was our measure of Supreme Court precedent. 
In summary, three variables were created to capture elements of the legal 
model, and predictions were made about the relationships between each of these 
variables and agency success. All of these measures are relatively rough indica- 
tors of legal effects, so even their combined effect probably underestimates the 
impact of law and precedent on courts' decisions. Nevertheless, by providing 
predictions of the relationships that could be expected to exist if judges in fact 
were constrained by precedent, etc., we may obtain at least a general assessment 
of the validity of the legal model. To these measures of the effect of the legal 
model, we added one measure of the propensity of judges to support agency de- 
cisions that advanced their policy preferences. 
Data and Methods 
The focus of the present study is the success rates of administrative agencies 
in the U.S. Courts of Appeals from 1969 to 1988.3 Existing research on the 
Supreme Court suggests that administrative agencies should be one of the more 
successful litigants appearing before the court. The starting point for analysis is 
the computation of the overall success rates of the agencies for this 20-year 
period. 
Once the success rate has been determined, an attempt will be made to test the 
model for predicting agency success described above. The dependent variable for 
this analysis is agency success, which takes the value 1 if the agency position is 
supported by the court and 0 if the agency decision is reversed. Mixed decisions, 
where the agency was supported in part and reversed in part, were excluded from 
analysis. 
Because least squares regression is inappropriate when the dependent variable 
is dichotomous (Aldrich and Nelson 1984), as in the present analysis, the parame- 
ters of the models were estimated by logistic regression, a maximum-likelihood 
estimation technique. This method produces estimates for the parameters of a 
model's independent variables in terms of the contribution each makes to the 
probability that the dependent variable falls into one of the designated categories 
3Our analysis begins at the beginning of the "judicialization of the administrative process" 
(O'Brien 1986, 33) and ends at the end of the Appeals Court database. O'Brien (1986) argues that 
beginning in the early 1970s there was diminished judicial deference to agency discretion and ex- 
pertise, and greater judicial policymaking. Melnick (1983) agrees, noting that the early 1970s 
ushered in a "new era in administrative law" characterized by more critical judicial overview of 
agency action (9). Beginning our analysis in 1969 allows us to test if deference to the agencies and 
adherence to the law was diminished by attention to policy preferences of judges, as proponents of a 
political model would suggest. 
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(e.g., an agency was supported or not supported). For each independent variable, 
a maximum-likelihood estimate (MLE) is calculated along with its standard error 
(SE). The MLEs represent the change in the logistic function that results from a 
one-unit change in the independent variable. 
The data for this analysis comes from the Appeals Court Data Base.4 From the 
database, which includes a stratified random sample of all published decisions of 
the Courts of Appeals from 1925 to 1988, all cases from the last 20 years of the 
database (1969-88) where a federal agency is a party, as either an appellant or a 
respondent, were examined. The data on the appeals court judges and their party 
affiliations comes from the Auburn judge database.5 
Agency Success in the Courts of Appeals 
Examination of Table 1 indicates that federal agencies are successful in the 
courts of appeals. Overall, agencies won slightly over three-fifths of the cases 
that reached the courts. Since many of their opponents were repeat players with 
substantial resources, this success rate is significant. Nevertheless, the rate of 
success of agencies in the courts of appeals appears to be substantially lower 
than the success other studies have reported them achieving in the Supreme 
Court, and is somewhat lower than the success rate for agencies in the D.C. cir- 
cuit reported by Willison (1986).6 
Having established that agencies are generally successful, we next turn to our 
model of the factors that contribute to that success. The results are presented in 
Table 2. The coefficients in Table 2 show the change in the log of the odds ratio 
TABLE 1 
Success Rate of Federal Administrative Agencies 
in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 1969-1988 
Success of agency when appearing as respondent = 62.6% (N = 559) 
Success of agency when appearing as appellant = 43.4% (N = 175) 
Overall success rate = 58.0% (N = 734) 
4The United States Courts of Appeals Data Base, Donald R. Songer (Principal Investigator), NSF# 
SES- 8912678. 
5The United States Courts of Appeals Judge Data Base, Gary Zuk, Deborah J. Barrow, and Gerard 
S. Gryski (Co-Principal Investigators), NSF# SBR-93-11999. 
6This aggregate success rate is also substantially lower than those found by Unah (1997) for the 
International Trade Commission and the Department of Commerce in the Federal Circuit. When we 
examined the success rates of agencies individually, we found significant variation among agencies. 
Several agencies had success rates equal to or greater than the aggregate success rate in the Supreme 
Court, whereas others, like the NLRB, lost more than half the cases in which they appeared. Further 
research may explore the agencies individually to determine if there are idiosyncratic factors influ- 
encing success. 
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TABLE 2 
A Logistic Regression Model of Federal Agency Success 
in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 1969-1988 
Independent Variables MLE SE Impacta 
Panel Judge Ideology -2.000** 0.623 -.381 
Agency Direction 0.539** 0.174 .132 
Panel Ideology * Agency Direction 2.973** 0.839 .452 
Supreme Court Precedent 0.025* 0.011 .007 
Substantial Evidence 0.469** 0.176 .115 
Federal Law -0.301* 0.164 -0.75 
Intercept -0.804 0.435 
aThe impact value displayed is the impact on the probability of agency success for a one-unit 
change in the value of the variable in question compared to a value of zero. 
% categorized correctly = 64.7% 
Reduction of error = 18.7% 
-2 LLR = 950.775 
Model chi-square = 45.975; df = 6; p < .0001 
Gamma = 0.298 
Number of cases = 733 
*significant at .05 
**significant at .01 
for a decision by the court to support the position of the agency, given the pres- 
ence of each of the other independent variables. Since this coefficient is not 
readily interpretable, we provide under the column labeled "impact" the esti- 
mated increase or decrease in the probability of a supportive decision when the 
variable in question is present. This estimate assumes that a supportive decision 
otherwise has a 50-50 chance of being made.7 
At first glance, the data in Table 2 appear to suggest that the effect of judicial 
preferences on the chances for agency success in the courts of appeals mirror the 
findings of Crowley (1987) and Sheehan (1990, 1992) in the Supreme Court. 
Panels of liberal judges are much more likely to uphold liberal than conservative 
agency decisions and conservative judges favor conservative decisions. For ex- 
ample, for a liberal agency decision that had a 50% chance of being supported 
by a politically neutral panel of judges, there would be an estimated 88% chance 
that a panel with three judges appointed by a liberal, ideologically conscious 
president (e.g., Johnson) would support the agency. On the other hand, the same 
decision would have only a 12% chance of support if the judges were appointed 
by a conservative president like Reagan. These results suggest that the policy 
preferences of the judges are strongly related to the probability that the agency 
will win in court. 
7At any other value, the estimated impact depends on whether the coefficient is positive or nega- 
tive. Only at .50 is it symmetrical and thus nonarbitrary. 
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The studies of agency success in the Supreme Court assumed that a finding 
that the probability of agency success was strongly correlated with the congru- 
ence (or lack of congruence) between the policy direction of the agency decision 
and the policy preferences of the justices meant that the legal model was irrele- 
vant. In contrast, our model of appeals court decisions attempted to measure 
more directly whether legal variables mattered. Three variables that tapped vari- 
ous aspects of the legal model were included in the analysis. First, the legal 
model led to the prediction that the appeals court would be responsive to trends 
in Supreme Court policy. Specifically, we hypothesized that the probability of 
success in the Supreme Court for the agency, based upon the directionality of the 
agency's decision, would influence the voting behavior of the circuit judges. The 
variable Supreme Court Precedent was in the correct direction and statistically 
significant, providing support for our hypothesis. That is, as the Supreme Court 
became more conservative, the probability that the courts of appeals would sup- 
port a conservative agency decision increased. For example, using the value of 
the impact measure reported in Table 2, we can predict that a conservative 
agency decision that had a 50% chance of being supported by the courts of ap- 
peals in 1970 would have a 66% chance of support by the same panel of judges 
in 1980 when the Supreme Court had become considerably more conservative. 
The second prediction derived from the legal model was that agencies would 
have a greater chance of success when the appeals court applied the substantial 
evidence doctrine. The data in Table 2 indicate that the expectation of success in 
substantial evidence cases received strong support. An agency decision that 
would otherwise have a 50% chance of support would have a 61% chance of 
support if the substantial evidence doctrine was applied. In addition, the expec- 
tation that agencies would be less successful in cases raising challenges to a 
federal law was also confirmed in the model. 
In summary, the predictions that were derived from the legal model received 
substantial support in the data. All of the relationships were in the predicted di- 
rection, were statistically significant, and the magnitude of the effects appears to 
be substantial. 
Conclusions 
The data in this study demonstrate that while administrative agencies do not 
enjoy as high a level of success in the courts of appeals as in the Supreme Court, 
they are still successful in over half the cases in which they appear. 
The findings suggest that agency success in the appeals courts, as in the 
Supreme Court, is strongly related to political considerations. Judges at both lev- 
els are much more likely to uphold the exercise of discretion by the agency when 
the policy implications of that exercise are consistent with the policy preferences 
of the judges. However, it would be a mistake to view judicial review of agency 
decisions as a purely political exercise. The judges do not appear to simply 
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substitute their own policy preferences for those of the administrators without re- 
gard for law. Variables that captured elements of the legal model were also 
related to judicial decisions to a statistically significant degree. Taken together, 
the evidence suggests that the appeals courts appear to respond to both legal con- 
cerns and political preferences. Thus, while it would be naive to believe that 
politics is irrelevant in judicial review of agencies, it appears that the courts do 
fulfill, at least in part, the normative expectations that they will constrain the 
worst abuses of discretion by administrators by imposing the rule of law. We be- 
lieve that the most reasonable explanation of the findings is that the courts of 
appeals are staffed with judges who are policy oriented and attempt to bring 
agency policy into line with their own policy preferences but feel constrained to 
pursue their preferences within limits set by the law. Put slightly differently, the 
courts are responsive to the law even though the law does not always dictate an 
unambiguous resolution of every case. As a result, when Supreme Court prece- 
dent becomes more conservative, the courts of appeals adjust their own patterns 
of decision making. Liberal panels still attempt to find ways to achieve liberal 
outcomes, but will feel their discretion to achieve those ends to be more limited. 
Thus, as Supreme Court precedent shifts in a conservative direction, it appears 
that the decision patterns of both conservative and liberal appeals court panels 
will become more conservative, even though the probability of a liberal decision 
will remain greater if the panel is composed of liberal judges. 
Since several studies noted above suggest that in the Supreme Court, the na- 
ture of the agency may affect the probability of agency success in the courts, we 
ran additional models controlling for agency type (both economic/social and in- 
dependent/executive). We found that these control variables did not have a 
significant impact on the strength of our existing variables. Furthermore, the 
model was not significantly improved by the addition of these variables, and nei- 
ther variable was statistically significant. We think this is an interesting sidelight 
of our model since studies on the Supreme Court found agency types to be sig- 
nificant. When we ran a model with only the agency type variables, we found 
that the economic/social dichotomy was significant, but the independent/execu- 
tive was not. These findings suggest that once controls are introduced for both 
legal constraints and the policy implications of the decisions, agency type per se 
appears to be irrelevant. 
The measures employed of both political preferences and legal constraints are 
admittedly rough. The most likely result of the use of such rough indicators is an 
increase in random error, and this may account for the substantial amount of un- 
explained variance in the model. Future research should strive to develop more 
precise indicators. In particular, we were only able to develop indirect indicators 
of legal effects. Instead of directly measuring the degree to which precedent in a 
given case supported a decision to uphold agency discretion, we were only able 
to make predictions from rough indicators of issues about the pattern of results 
that could be expected if the legal model were valid. The support of these pre- 
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dictions certainly is consistent with the hypothesis that law matters, but future re- 
search can hopefully produce more direct measures of the impact of precedent. 
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